2   Artículos

 
en línea
Álvaro Forteza, Cecilia Noboa     Pág. 31 - 59
We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain ?flexibility?. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may ... ver más
Revista: Estudios de Economía    Formato: Electrónico

 
en línea
Alvaro Forteza     Pág. pp. 27 - 44
Excess distortions in government transfer policies might result from the government lack of ability to commit not to help unlucky agents. Incentive considerations that are crucial in standard insurance in the presence of moral hazard play, no role in thi... ver más
Revista: Estudios de Economía    Formato: Electrónico

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