Resumen
Decentralized identity (DID) systems aim to give users full control over their identities by using completely decentralized technologies, such as blockchain or distributed ledgers, as identity providers. However, when user credentials are compromised, it is impossible in existing DID systems for the users to detect credential misuse. In this paper, we propose new DID authentication protocols with two properties: auditability and privacy. The former enables the detection of malicious authentication events, while the latter prevents an adversary from linking an authentication event to the corresponding user and service provider. We present two protocols that achieve auditability with varying privacy and performance guarantees. The first protocol has high performance, but it reveals information about the user. The second protocol achieves full privacy, but it incurs a higher performance overhead. We present a formal security analysis of our privacy-preserving protocols by using the Tamarin prover. We implemented them and evaluated their performance with a permissioned blockchain deployed over the Amazon AWS and a local cloud infrastructure. The results demonstrate that the first protocol is able to support realistic authentication workloads, while the second is nearly practical.