Port Strategy to Minimise COVID-19 Risk in Cruise Ports: Application to the Port of Arrecife in Lanzarote

Abstract

The main objective of this article is to develop a methodology to detect, assess and prevent biosecurity-related risks. Currently, the main risk found in our daily life is COVID-19, which has triggered a serious global pandemic. As a result, economic and social activity has suffered a decline in its development and evolution compared to previous years. All activity has come to a standstill and we are in a process of improvement that needs time. With the help of this methodology, focused on cruise traffic, it will be possible to identify the greatest existing threat and the process by which this high level of risk occurs. Once identified, a series of measures can be proposed to mitigate and prevent the risk, in order to make the port a safer place. The main aim is to recover cruise traffic as soon as possible, as it makes an important contribution to the tourism sector and to the cities and countries where cruise ships call.

1. Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic that broke out in 2020 was a turning point in our lives. In the field of transport, the importance of the sector for economic and social development became evident. As for ports, which are the main entry and exit point for goods in a country such as Spain, their role has been essential for the sustainability of the economy, and although traffic was affected during lock-down restrictions, it recovered after the return to normal activity. However, passenger traffic, and more specifically cruise ship traffic, was strongly affected; the latter was reduced to almost zero values due to the fear of contagion and the lack of protocols in ports to minimise the risk of transmission of the virus.

The information related to existing risks, particularly those related to biosecurity, as well as the methodologies that have been developed and are currently in use, do not focus on cruise traffic in our ports, which need an effective and efficient solution to minimise risks and return to pre-pandemic traffic. In view of this situation, there is a lack of research that defines a methodology for assessing, detecting and preventing biosecurity-related risks, in particular COVID-19, in the ports of the Spanish port system, focusing on the case of cruise ship traffic due to the greater degree of exposure to biological risk. In order to detect and evaluate the risk, it is necessary to distinguish the threats and the assets that are exposed to these threats within the port processes involved in cruise ship traffic. It is necessary to identify the threats through which cruise ship traffic is subject to biological risks by establishing qualitative and quantitative criteria to draw up risk matrices for each of the processes. It will be necessary to consider the probability of occurrence of the threat, the consequences it produces and the vulnerability that is present at each moment according to the process.

With these three variables differentiated, it will be possible to obtain the impact of the risk as a product of these variables and, in this way, it will be possible to identify the level of risk that exists in each of the port processes for cruise ship traffic. With the help of individual risk matrices obtained for each process, a global matrix can be obtained that allows the risk to be assessed as accurately as possible. Thus, it is possible to propose preventive and mitigating measures for each type of hazard and in each zone of the port typology studied.

Thus, the problem to be solved is to define a methodology for the activities and processes that should be applied in Spanish ports for cruise ship traffic in order to minimise possible contagions derived from COVID-19.

Thus, the aim of this article is to propose a methodology to be applied to the case of cruise ship traffic in Spanish ports to detect, evaluate and prevent COVID-19 risks associated with cruise ship traffic in ports. The proposed methodology can be applied to cruise terminals in all ports in the Spanish port system, although this article has focused on the port of Arrecife, in Lanzarote, which, due to its island nature and the importance of cruise traffic, is a highly representative example.

The port of Arrecife currently has three kilometres of mooring line, 120 hectares of flotation and 450,000 square metres of land area. Cruise traffic is one of its greatest assets, with some 423,000 cruise passengers a year, making it the second port in the Canary Islands in terms of cruise arrivals. It is fundamentally a port of call, where ships dock between the beginning and the end of their voyage and can stay there for a day or even just a few hours.

There are several docks where cruise ships can dock (Figure 1): Muelle de Cruceros, Naos, Mármoles, Prolongación de Mármoles, Transbordadores Poniente and, in the event of an emergency or last-minute request for a stopover in an exceptional situation, Transbordadores Naciente, provided that it is not occupied by container ships.

Figure 2 clearly shows the evolution of cruise ship traffic throughout the year in the Port of Arrecife. Furthermore, it can also be seen that in 2020, with the start of the pandemic caused by COVID-19, traffic came to a standstill from March onwards and by the end of the year it was growing slightly. In 2021 it was not able to recover 100% of its capacity, due to restrictions and measures that still had to be carried out.

In terms of the number of passengers in each month of the year, there is a clear upward trend in the winter months, with the summer months being the months with the fewest passengers.

All in all, this article contributes to the minimisation of contagions derived from COVID-19 through the application of risk mitigation measures following the application of the proposed methodology for cruise ship port traffic. It should be noted that the article represents a significant advance in the application of the methodology to a type of port traffic which is of great importance and vulnerability and which had not been studied before.

2. State of the Art

The scientific world is developing techniques for the identification and preventive analysis of risks so that appropriate risk elimination, mitigation, control or assurance measures can be implemented. In particular, ports are sources of risk to their environment, as well as being subject to risks (antisocial, natural, political, etc.).

A port project, as a whole, requires serious identification and analysis of the risks that may occur and an appropriate strategy to deal with them.

The most commonly used techniques for the identification of risks in a port according to [1] are:

• The specifications of the applicable technical regulations.
• Pathological experience in this type of facility.
• The experience of risk professionals.
• Staging of professionals at risk.
• The staging of situations, using Fuente-Diana techniques.
• The study of flows or activities within the port.
• Laboratory experimentation on uncertain situations.
• Surveys of operators or technicians or users of the facilities.
• Analysis of conflicts of interest between parties and contracts.

Biosafety is understood as a set of rules, measures and protocols that are applied in multiple procedures related to scientific research and teaching work with the aim of contributing to the prevention of risks or infections derived from exposure to potentially infectious agents or with significant biological, chemical and/or physical risk loads, such as, for example, the handling of special waste, the storage of reagents and the use of protective barriers [2].

In Spain, in the workplace, the reference regulation related to the exposure of workers to biological agents is Royal Decree 664/1997 of 12 May [3].

In the work environment, infectious and parasitic processes can be transmitted in different ways; often they are diseases carried by animals and spread to a worker who is in contact or in proximity to the animal or its products. Other times it can be caused by transmission from other human beings, where the spread occurs mainly through the air, utensils or devices for personal or shared use. Another source of risk is the handling of contaminated products, where living organisms reach the handler’s body through contact, wounds, or by simple release into the environment [3].

The different types of biosecurity-related risks that can occur are as follows [4]:

• Biological risk: refers to all micro-organisms and their toxins, including genetically modified micro-organisms in cell cultures and human parasites, that are likely to cause any type of infection, allergy or toxicity.
• Physical risk: this enhances the biological risk and depends on the physical state of each person, which may present a greater or lesser risk of contracting the disease.
• Chemical risk: enhances biological risk and may cause laboratory hazards or the unplanned release of viruses and laboratory-generated diseases.
• Psychophysiological or human risk: this enhances the biological risk, depending on the state of health of each person and the consequences that the disease may have on his or her body.
• Environmental risk: may increase the likelihood of disease transmission through the environment.

Biological risk assessment is one of the key principles of biosecurity, the process used to identify the hazard characteristics of an infectious organism, the activities that could lead to exposure, the likelihood of contracting a disease following exposure and the consequences of infection [5]. In 2020, with the onset of the global pandemic caused by COVID-19, the identification and assessment of biosecurity-related risks became the key element of any economic or social activity. This disease is transmitted from person to person through contact with respiratory droplets from infected persons transmitted directly or through secretions contaminating hands and objects. It is also necessary to consider that biological agents are found everywhere, so any activity can have a risk of exposure, especially where animals and plants and their products or wastes are present or handled and where people are present [6]. All this has led to society’s need to regain confidence in security in its daily activities. It should be borne in mind that there is no such thing as regaining confidence under the principle of absolute security and there is a need for society to visualise risk and make decisions based on that risk [7]. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) produced a document on safety and health in the workplace and the most appropriate way to proceed in the case of COVID-19, as it is also an occupational disease as soon as one is infected at the workplace. Country-specific protocols on health, safety and occupational risk prevention have been developed in relation to operations, the health system, etc. [7].

According to [8], a risk event is any event that is not known for sure in advance. Based on this, it can be concluded that risk rules out certain events and that some events that are not known today may be known tomorrow. This implies that attempting to rationalise risk events may conflict with the scientific belief that any event can be explained in a cause-effect framework. Despite this, the fact remains that risk events do exist; this argument is supported by three main factors.

First, there is a risk due to our inability to accurately control and/or measure some causal factors of events; second, there is a risk due to our limited ability to process information; and third, the information needed to fully analyse a system should be obtained only if its benefits outweigh its cost. Regarding biological agents affecting biosecurity, these can be classified by species (bacteria, viruses, fungi and parasites), by their dangerousness, their ease of propagation, degree of effectiveness and the existence or not of a vaccine [3].

According to these criteria, there are four groups of organisms that correspond to four different levels of danger, as follows [3]:

• Group 1: Biological agent unlikely to cause disease in humans.
• Group 2: A pathogenic agent that can cause disease in humans and may pose a hazard to workers, is unlikely to spread to the community and effective treatments are available to mitigate it.
• Group 3: A pathogenic agent that can cause disease in humans and presents a serious hazard to workers; there is a risk of spreading to the community and effective treatment is generally available.
• Group 4: Pathogen causing serious disease in humans and posing a serious hazard to workers, with a high likelihood of spreading to the community and generally no effective treatment.

Regarding biosecurity in ports, the International Association of Engineers and Architects (IAEA) has created a “safe and resilient port” label for biosecure ports due to the need for cruise ships and ports in general to have infection prevention and safety measures and protective equipment for their crew members, providing continuity of activities and adjusting liability in case of contagion [7].

In particular, the cruise industry faces the challenge of reducing the biosecurity risk to desirable or even excellent levels. Therefore, the IAEA label develops a classification of the level of biosecurity adopted by ports in terms of civil and occupational biosecurity [7].

This label establishes the gradation of protection to adjust the risk at each level with the aim of ensuring biosecurity within cruise ships and classifies them into three different levels: adequate, outstanding and excellent [7].

• Adequate: complies with protocols and mandatory means of protection are incorporated.
• Highlighted: risk prevention and risk-based means of protection and means of protection against biosecurity risks are incorporated. This is the desirable level.
• Excellent: level where the risk is fully managed and the available means of protection are used to the maximum level that corresponds to the lowest level of risk.

The objectives of the label are to manage biosafety by applying the principles of risk prevention to minimise exposure and mitigate its consequences, in order to meet the requirements and demands that apply from the legal, social, ethical, moral, economic and scientific points of view.

The IAEA certifies ports that adopt and implement the measures that the label entails and that demonstrate compliance with the biosecurity criteria, which implies that measures have been taken for the prevention, minimisation and control of risks, that individual and collective protection elements are in place, that work organisation is carried out and that economic activities are coordinated [7].

To ensure compliance with the IAEA Mark, ISO 31000 is applied. A multidisciplinary team of experts (chemists, virologists, engineers, architects) is required to draw up the protection systems map, analyse its reliability and design the final risk assessment tool. In addition, the team must verify the level of compliance of each of the dimensions using a scoring procedure, calculate the total and use the result to define the cruise level and continuously monitor compliance [7].

It is not only cruise ships that are a major source of disease transmission and biosecurity risk, but also the handling of different cargoes arriving in ports on ships from countries all over the world. One example is the loading and unloading of live animals and the measures taken to prevent the occurrence of risks [9].

To be more specific, the possible impact of COVID-19 on the analysis of biosecurity in ports can be analysed in more detail. Among the problems that this pandemic may generate in ports, it can be stated that there is a wide range of implications and risks in the shipping industry, regarding the health of the crew and passengers, the difficulty of crew changes or the refusal of the crew to go to an affected area.

A risk assessment is a tool used to evaluate operational risks so that an organisation can effectively mitigate and manage them to an acceptable level [10]. Risk analysis is a systematic process that is based on the scientific collection and evaluation of information relevant to a given risk, which is called a risk factor, in order to be able to estimate the probability of occurrence and the impact that its occurrence may have. The risk to be analysed is related to preventing the introduction of pathogens, preventing contagion and preventing it from being too late to control the spread of a disease.

Once the risks have been identified and classified, an analysis of the risks must be carried out by studying the possibility of occurrence and the consequences of each risk factor in order to establish the level of risk of the project.

The task of risk management should include an estimation of the magnitude of a particular risk and an assessment of the significance of the risk. The risk management process has two parts [11]:

• Risk evaluation: quantification of risk from data and understanding of the processes involved.
• Risk assessment: the social and political judgement of the importance of various risks as faced by individuals and communities.

In order to understand risk and compare different risks, it is necessary to quantify risk by collecting information on the effects of the various hazards that cause risk and on the basis of statistical analyses that predict the likelihood of future events. Identifying the causes and effects and understanding the processes of disastrous events is critical for future risk assessment [11].

The accuracy of risk quantification depends largely on the amount of information available. The number of events for which information is available must be sufficiently high to be statistically significant and the quality and accuracy of the information must be adequate. The three following components of risk assessment are essential [12]:

• The probability of occurrence of the hazard: the likelihood of experiencing a natural or technological hazard in a location or region;
• Elements at risk: identification and preparation of an inventory of elements that could be affected in the event of a hazard and where the estimation of their economic value is necessary;
• Vulnerability of risk elements: estimation of the damage people or buildings or any element will suffer if they experience some level of risk.

The methods most commonly used to carry out risk analysis are grouped into three classes [13]:

• Qualitative methods: These are the most commonly used methods in risk analysis for decision making in business projects. They can be used when the risk is low and does not justify the time and resources needed to do a full analysis. These methods include brainstorming, questionnaires and interviews, evaluation for multidisciplinary groups and specialist and expert judgement, known as the Delphi technique.
• Semi-quantitative methods: classifications such as high, medium or low, or more detailed descriptions of likelihood and consequence are used. These ratings are demonstrated in relation to an appropriate scale for calculating the level of risk. Special attention should be paid to the scale in order to avoid misunderstandings or misinterpretations of the calculation results.
• Quantitative methods: these involve assigning occurrence values to the different risks identified, i.e., calculating the level of risk. They include probability analysis, consequence analysis and computer simulation. The most relevant is the Monte Carlo method, which is detailed below.

The Monte Carlo method seeks to represent reality through a mathematical risk model so that, by randomly assigning values to the variables of the model, different scenarios and results are obtained. It is based on a sufficiently high number of iterations to be representative of reality. Using the results obtained from the different iterations, a statistical study is carried out from which relevant conclusions are drawn regarding the risk of a project [13].

Other articles such as [14], tried to estimate the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on shipping trade. Using panel data and by comparing behaviour in three different regions of the world (Southeast Asia, North America and the European Union), trends were analysed. It is clear that government prevention and control measures have a negative impact on export trade, whereas import trade increases accordingly.

In [15], a framework was proposed to analyse the impact of COVID-19 on port traffic using Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, whereas [16] analysed the impact of the pandemic on individuals’ willingness to go on a cruise depending on the country of residence.

Finally, [17] examined the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on cruise passengers’ behaviour and provided a guiding framework that helps cruise academics and operators to maximise existing and potential passengers’ favourable decisions.

3. Methodology

All risk analysis is based on the identification of threats, which in our case refers to those arising from the existence of the global pandemic caused by COVID-19 leaving aside all those that may occur with regard to other aspects within the port [18].

The first step was identifying the new parameters that must be considered when assessing the risks to different types of ports, which involved reviewing the existing methodologies for assessing risks to infrastructures and selecting the methodologies that are best suited to ports [19,20,21], taking into account the specific characteristics of the port considered in this paper.

The proposed methodology aims to focus on the land side of the port, especially on the processes that are related to cruise traffic. In order to carry out the methodology, it is necessary to use data from actual events that currently occur in port terminals, in order to know the probability of the occurrence of hazards, the consequences they could cause and the vulnerability of the port to these hazards. The methodology used the following steps (Figure 3).

The proposed methodology is based on different phases that allow an approach to the issue to be resolved by identifying the main threats to which cruise ship traffic is exposed in ports and establishing criteria that allow risk matrices to be defined for the different processes considered in port operations. Thus, a global risk matrix can be defined to adequately assess the level of risk and define risk mitigation actions.

Stage 1: Identify the processes that take place in the port. This stage seeks to identify all the processes that take place within the port when the ship arrives at the port, distinguishing between port of call and home port.

Step 2: Identify the threats that may occur and the assets exposed. Once the processes in the port have been identified on arrival of the vessel, the different threats to which each of the assets that are exposed must be taken into account. The port authorities are involved in these processes in order to carry out all the activities necessary to provide the different port services.

Step 3: Establish qualitative and quantitative criteria for the risk matrix, which are necessary to identify a scale for measuring the impact of the different threats on each of the processes when assessing the risk.

Step 4: Define a risk matrix for each process. In order to draw up the risk matrices for each of the processes being developed, the probability of occurrence of the threat, the consequences that it would generate in the event of occurrence and the vulnerability of each of the processes exposed to these threats must be considered.

Step 5: Obtain a global risk matrix. In order to summarise the risk matrices for each of the processes, a global matrix must be obtained for each type of port studied, port and port of call, which allows the risk in each of them to be assessed and the areas most exposed to hazards to be identified.

Stage 6: Propose preventive and risk mitigation measures. Once the threats have been identified and the risk assessed, it is necessary to propose a series of measures to prevent and mitigate the risk in each of the processes identified for each type of port.

4. Discussion

4.1. Identification of Processes

The processes that are carried out from the moment the ship enters port waters must be differentiated between the arrival and departure branches. In the same way, when considering the processes, the different areas of the port in which they are carried out are also separated into the following: the external area of entry and exit of the port, the internal area of the terminal and the external area of embarkation/disembarkation of passengers.

In the case of the port of call, the arrival of the ship at the port and disembarkation of passengers takes place in the following process (Figure 4):

• Arrival of the cruise ship in port: embarkation of the pilot or pilot on board the cruise ship in port waters.
• Mooring of the cruise ship: the moorers are involved.
• Passenger disembarkation: Passengers disembark from the cruise ship via the gangways provided.
• Temperature control: two options can be given.

  a.

  If the temperature is higher than legally permitted (>37.5 °C), carry out antigen testing in the appropriate facilities. If positive, the trip is cancelled and cruise passengers are checked and tested without being allowed to leave the cruise ship, otherwise they will be contacted for tracing and follow up.

  b.

  If the temperature is below the legally permitted temperature (<37.5 °C), the ship continues its journey as normal.

• Passenger scanning: security staff carry out passenger and baggage scanning.
• Passengers go out onto the street, they can do this in different ways: go on an excursion in a chartered bus, go out onto the street directly, take a taxi, hire a vehicle for the day from one of the companies available, etc.

In the opposite case, the return of passengers to the cruise ship and its departure follows the following process: (Figure 5).

• Return of passengers to the port: using the different alternatives considered.
• Temperature control: different possibilities are possible, analogous to those specified for the arrival of the ship.
• Passenger scanning: to check entry to the port and to the cruise ship again.
• Boarding pass control: security staff must check that only authorised persons board the aircraft.
• Use of terminal facilities: such as toilets, shops, restaurants and waiting rooms.
• Passengers board the cruise ship: by means of the gangways provided for this purpose.
• Departure of the cruise ship from the port: embarkation of the pilot on board the cruise ship to assist in leaving the port waters.

4.2. Threat Identification

The COVID-19-related threats to which the different assets carrying out the processes in the port are exposed are mainly contagion by inhalation, by contact with contaminated surfaces or by contact with people.

These threats can be broken down into different variants, which can be referred to as sub-threats, allowing the impact of all of them to be analysed in order to create the risk matrix. These allow the development of different situations in which the studied threats occur. The people who may be exposed to the threats caused by COVID-19 infection, within the operational processes of the cruise terminal with the arrival of the ship at the port, are the following (Figure 6 and Figure 7):

• Practical: as the person who goes on board the cruise ship to give the appropriate instructions to the ship’s captain when the ship enters the port, there is a high risk of contagion from being in contact with the captain and officers;
• Tugs: they do not have to experience any contact with the cruise ship’s crew as their only function is to tow and assist in manoeuvring the ship from the outside;
• The moorers: they do not necessarily have to be in contact with the passengers or the crew of the cruise ship in the course of their work, but they are in contact with the moorers themselves, and having to work as a team poses a higher risk;
• Maritime Rescue personnel: in the event of having to intervene in an emergency, Maritime Rescue personnel would be in contact with the passengers or crew members of the cruise ship;
• Customs agents: they are in contact with the goods, they carry out checks on what is being transported in order to prevent the entry of illegal goods. In the case of passenger transport, they are not directly involved in the processes;
• Tour-operator: person who is in charge of resolving any doubts or attending to any needs that passengers may have, so he/she must be in contact with them and talk to them;
• Baggage handlers: personnel who are in direct contact with and handling the baggage of cruise passengers;
• Security staff: ensure that the security measures imposed at the terminal are respected. They must be close to the passengers to ensure that all properly imposed measures are respected;
• Staff carrying out boarding pass control: they carry out the handling of documents and come into contact with passengers to control boarding and port entry passes and ensure the necessary legal procedures are followed.
• Shops and catering staff within the terminal: passengers will shop or consume in the terminal establishments available to them.
• Cleaning staff in terminal facilities: they are directly exposed to threats by having to disinfect and clean surfaces that have been touched by all the people who have passed through these areas.
• Bus and taxi drivers transporting passengers: drivers are in contact with passengers to transport them to desired destinations.

4.3. Establishment of Criteria for Risk Matrices

The following quantitative and qualitative criteria were used to assess the risk by means of the corresponding risk matrices in each process. These were agreed by means of a Delphi analysis in which personnel from the port of Arrecife, the academic world, consultants and cruise company agents participated.

Probability of occurrence of the threat: Unlikely: contagion does not occur in the process (0%). Unlikely: rarely occurs but can happen (0–30%). Possible: infection occurs in isolated cases (30–60%). Very likely: contagion occurs frequently (60–90%). Safe: contagion always occurs (90–100%).

Consequence of contagion occurring: Nil: no consequences because it does not occur (0%). Mild: controllable, some isolated cases (0–30%) Medium: it becomes difficult to control expansion (30–60%). Significant: contagion spreads to the majority of passengers (60–90%). Catastrophic: all passengers and some staff (90–100%) are infected.

Vulnerability: degree of affectation as a consequence of the occurrence of an event or impact. It is measured by the elements that are exposed to the hazard. Very low: no exposure to the threat in any of the processes (0%). Low: there is some exposure in a small part of the processes (0–30%). Medium: highest number of elements exposed to the threat and in half of the processes (30–60%). High: almost all elements exposed to the threat in most of the processes (60–90%). Very high: all elements are exposed in all processes (90–100%).

Impact: Likelihood of Occurrence x Consequence x Vulnerability. Low: nothing happens (0–10%). Moderate: some infection occurs, but is isolated (10–30%). Medium: transmission occurs but is controlled (30–60%). High: infections occur and start to spread (60–90%). Extreme: difficult to control the spread of infection (90–100%).

Thus, the combination of the different criteria affecting vulnerability and impact allows us to obtain the following matrix of risk assessment criteria.

4.4. Definition of the Risk Matrices of the Different Processes

The risk matrices presented below were obtained for the different areas of the port, which are: the outer passenger embarkation and disembarkation area, the inner terminal area and the outer port entrance and exit area. It should be noted that the risk assessment was carried out qualitatively in these matrices.

• External embarkation and disembarkation area (Figure 7).
• Interior area of the terminal, where most of the passenger access control processes take place and where a variety of services are provided (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Risk matrix 2. Source: own elaboration.

Figure 8. Risk matrix 2. Source: own elaboration.

3.

External exit or entrance area (Figure 9).

4.5. Definition of the Overall Risk Matrix

Once the risk has been assessed in the different processes that take place from the time the cruise ship arrives at the port until it leaves the port, the study can be summarised in an overall risk matrix (Figure 10).

This global matrix will allow the identification of the threat that can cause the greatest consequences within the operations carried out in the port and the vulnerability of the port to it, as well as the likelihood of its occurrence.

4.6. Proposed Preventive Measures

The safe management of port facilities where cruise passenger transport activities are carried out has five basic objectives (Ministry of Transport, 2020):

• Promote active measures to distance people;
• Reduce, as far as possible, the physical contact of people with the environment by implementing enhanced cleaning and disinfection measures in the environment;
• To facilitate the carrying out of the checks planned by shipping companies which, for whatever reason, require facilities inside or outside the terminal where cruise-type vessels operate;
• To promote the carrying out of the checks planned by shipping companies, the implementation of which, for whatever reason, requires facilities inside or outside the terminal where cruise-type vessels operate;
• Facilitate the execution of actions derived from the management of health incidents that have been detected on board a ship, or have been detected in passenger terminal facilities, which may affect passengers, ships’ crews, terminal ground staff, or other persons in transit through the terminal.

Once the different threats that can occur in the port upon the arrival of cruise ships and the critical points have been identified, a series of mitigation and prevention measures are established, which are listed in

Table 1. Measures to be implemented according to the threats identified in the port of Arrecife.

Threats	Measurements
Contagion by inhalation	Mandatory use of FFP2 masks for all Port of Arrecife personnel.
	2. Maintain ventilation in any enclosed space.
Contact with surfaces	Sanitising hydrogels throughout the area available to anyone.
	2. Automatic devices to reduce contact with surfaces, such as litter bins or automatic doors.
Contact with people	Work and movement in the area in watertight groups while maintaining as much as possible the distance between each person (1.5 m).
	2. Establish unidirectional entry/exit flows to avoid overcrowding and to ensure the social distance (1.5 m). 3. Limited seating in enclosed spaces.

.

In addition, other general measures can be implemented to reduce the impact of threats and prevent them from occurring, such as:

• Signposting with informative posters reflecting and reminding individuals of the obligatory measures against COVID-19 in port facilities. It is recommended that these signs be written in different languages to make them easier to understand for all the people who may pass through the facilities as cruise ship passengers come from various parts of the world;
• The use of portable thermal cameras so that they can be placed where they are needed at any given time, which would avoid exposing people to human contact by having to take their temperature with a hand-held thermometer. In addition, this would avoid crowding and queueing, as it would speed up the process significantly;
• The movement and parking of vehicles inside the port facilities must be restricted to avoid crowds. Only authorised buses for the collection of cruise passengers or any other vehicle with prior authorisation will be allowed access;
• With regard to the employees who work in all the processes that are carried out in the port to provide different services for the cruise ship, training sessions should be given so that they have knowledge of how to act at all times;
• Adequate coordination of the activities that take place in the port facilities should be carried out in order to avoid crowds of people in each one of them.

Passengers should provide their personal details for tracking so that in the event of the presence of a suspected case of contagion, it can be communicated to the persons who may have been in contact with them and followed up to prevent further spread. New methodologies can be included to carry out this measure, such as GPS tracking thanks to the technology that is currently being developed

5. Conclusions

The methodology developed is reliable and allows the identification of the highest levels of threat impact in an efficient manner. Thanks to this diagnosis, more preventive and mitigating measures can be implemented in this process, the main objective of which is to reduce the existing level of risk.

The methodology used establishes outlines that encompass most of the processes followed to carry out the operations and activities in cruise terminals.

The methodology used makes it possible to assess the biosecurity-related risk caused by COVID-19, making it possible to identify the threats present in the different processes carried out in the port and the assets exposed to these threats.

The application of the methodology has made it possible to identify the threat that most affects the assets that are exposed to it in the port, such as contagion through contact with people. This is due to the fact that, despite being a large space, there is a high number of passengers and personnel passing through the facilities and crowding can occur in certain areas. The variant of the threat that presents an extreme impact occurs when not wearing a mask and being in direct contact with other people for a prolonged period of time.

As a result, it can be concluded that the part of the terminal with the highest level of risk is the interior area, as it is an enclosed space with a wide range of services and activities.

In terms of the threats considered for biosecurity risk assessment, the main one would be COVID-19 infection. According to studies, this virus spreads more rapidly by inhalation of aerosols in the environment. This is one reason that leads to the conclusion that enclosed spaces will have a higher level of risk, and even more so if they are large spaces with a high number of people circulating in them.

The level of risk from contagion can be reduced by minimising transit time through the facilities and through the use of bubble groups for excursions and visits, allowing for greater screening of passengers, both inside and outside the port area.

The results obtained are considered adequate for the approaches defined in the port of Arrecife, although the limitations of the model are centred on the definition of the processes in the different port operations carried out for cruise ship traffic and on the effective application of the proposed measures. This is a very vulnerable type of traffic due to the large number of people to whom the measures must be applied.

For future research, it is proposed to extend the study to base ports and other ports where the level of cruise ship traffic is higher and the number of ships coinciding at the same time is greater, which complicates the design of the processes and the application of the proposed measures.