Kuhn’s paradigms, the problem of incommensurability and confrontation with Popper

Abstract

The Kuhnian view on the development of science is discussed. Special attention has been devoted to the concepts of paradigm, normal science, extraordinary science, incompatibility and incommensurability. If Newtonian mechanics is compared with relativistic one, it may be concluded that the corresponding revolutionary process implies both continuous and discontinuous elements. The continuous elements justify the correspondence principle connecting both theories and, as a consequence, commensurability too. On the other hand, the existence of discontinuous elements implies in a conceptual and radical rupture going beyond a mere mathematical limit of the correspondence process. In Newtonian mechanics, for instance, differently from relativistic mechanics, mass and energy are two dichotomic concepts, not convertible among themselves. The Kuhnian view and the Popperian view (this last one made up of conflicts through conjectures and refutations) are not completely suitable to explain real science. Science is much more complex than both approaches can cope with