The Reputation Effect
A Case Study of Credit Contracts in Transition Economies
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.20525/ijfbs.v4i1.201Keywords:
nternational Lending, Screening Devices, Fixed-Effects TechniqueAbstract
This paper proposes an empirical analysis of the role of memory in determining the size of credits granted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) during 1991–2003. We first build an original database from information associated with the number and contract types granted by clients, after which we develop an empirical strategy for capturing the role of memory, namely by defining three different indicators to approximate each client’s reputation. These indicators rely on the client’s identity and, when available, information associated with previous EBRD-financed investment projects. With the fixed-effects estimation technique, our results unambiguously show that the value of the first investment project financed by the EBRD, as a proxy for reputation, is the most effective indicator for established clients to determine the size of the credits they receive to finance further investments.
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