Resumen
The events of 9/11 in the United States led to a significant strengthening of security measures within air transport. The maritime sector could also be a target of terror attacks. For this reason the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was adapted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in order to increase security in the maritime sector. In particular chapter XI-2 was added to the SOLAS Convention on 12 December 2002 to face potential threats to ships and port facilities. Chapter XI-2 includes the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), which contains special measures to enhance maritime security. These measures are risk-based and differ according to the security threat to ships or port facilities. All measures of the different security levels (level 1-normal, level 2-heightened, level 3-exceptional) must be fixed by appropriate security plans and responsibilities must be assigned to security officers. However, there are areas in the maritime sector in which the security still shows gaps. For example there are no security checks for passengers, vehicles and cargo at ferry shipping, in contrary to cruise shipping. Although it is mandatory to perform access controls, the inspection of passengers and vehicles according to dangerous objects is not required and therefore missing. For this reason ferry shipping is committed to a high risk of terror attacks. The question arises of appropriate measures to increase security in the ferry shipping. At the same time it is important to investigate the consequences on the traffic flow that would be caused by additional security measures. Therefore, we transferred the established security measures of the aviation sector to the ferry shipping. In the aviation sector a security check according to dangerous objects is applied to everyone and everything who and which wants to enter the secure area. In addition to the well-known security checks of passengers also security checks for employees and vehicles are carried out. People are scanned with metal detectors and, if necessary, followed up by a manual check, regardless of whether they are passengers, staff or visitors. Their luggage is scanned by X-rays. The bottom of vehicles is screened for bombs with mirrors. The security officer goes around the vehicle with a long pole to which a mirror is attached. The interior and the trunk of the vehicle are inspected by view control. If necessary, there can be made more detailed follow-up checks. We transferred these security checks from the aviation sector to a ferry terminal by modeling them in a microscopic simulation. We examined the consequences on passenger and vehicle flows resulting from the implementation of such security measures. Our simulations deliver information about queue time and queue length at security checkpoints as well as the number of passengers, who will eventually miss their ferry boat as a consequence of these additional checks. Our analysis shows the serious consequences on the traffic flow which would result from an implementation of such security measures at ferry terminals.